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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The judicial function is a vast human practice that can be usefully 
examined from social, political, philosophical, economical, psycho-
logical and other theoretical paradigms. No single perspective is 
capable of capturing judging comprehensively. . . . Thus, rather 
than compete for theoretical dominance, scholars should be en-
couraged to pursue each and every avenue capable of enhancing 
our understanding of the complex and vital practice of judicial de-
cision making.1 
 
                                                                                                                    
 * Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University 
Law School. B.A., Stanford University, 1989; Ed.M., Harvard Graduate School of Educa-
tion, 1991; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1994. 
 ** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School; Ph.D. Student, Washington 
University. B.A. & B.S., Southern Methodist University, 1989; J.D., Stanford Law School, 
1992. 
 1. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 
1, 32 (1998); see also Elinor Ostrom, Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the 
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 
35 (Paul A. Sabatier ed., 1999).  
Because regularized human behavior occurs within a wide diversity of rule-
ordered situations that share structural features . . . there is no single disci-
pline that addresses all questions important for the study of human institu-
tions. Understanding the kinds of strategies and heuristics that humans adopt 
in diverse situations is enhanced by the study of anthropology, economics, game 
theory, history, law, philosophy, political science, psychology, public admini-
stration, and sociology. 
Id. at 38. 
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 Imagine a federal case on appeal about which you know nothing—
not the parties, not the issue in dispute, not the court ruling below, 
nothing. Suppose the case is being decided by the United States Su-
preme Court. If this is all you know about the case, what prediction 
would you make about its outcome? Now suppose, instead, that the 
case is being decided by a panel of circuit judges on the United States 
Courts of Appeals. You do not know the particular judges on the 
panel, nor do you even know the circuit where the case is being 
heard. If all you know about the case is that a three-judge panel in 
one of the circuits is hearing the case, what prediction would you 
make about its outcome?  
 Even if you are only a casual observer of the federal courts, you 
would probably predict that the Supreme Court would reverse but 
that the court of appeals would affirm. More often than not, you 
would be right. Reversals are a defining feature of the Supreme 
Court: over the last decade, the Supreme Court reversed 64% of the 
cases it heard.2 Affirmances are a defining feature of the courts of 
appeals: the courts of appeals affirmed 90% of the cases they decided 
during the same period.3  
 In a system in which the highest appellate court seldom affirms, 
why do the lower appellate courts routinely do so? What, in other 
words, accounts for this “affirmance effect”4 in the United States 
Courts of Appeals? Consistent with Dan Simon’s observation that ap-
pellate judging “can be usefully examined from social, political, phi-
losophical, economical, psychological and other theoretical para-
digms,”5 we use insights from multiple disciplines in this Article to ex-
plore why the courts of appeals so often affirm and so seldom reverse. 
We begin in Part II by offering a statistical overview of the affirmance 
effect. In Part III, we use political science to develop two theoretical 
explanations (a sincere-rational-actor account and a strategic-rational-
actor account) for this phenomenon and psychology and behavioral 
economics to develop a third explanation (a bounded-rationality ac-
count). We conclude that each of these accounts sheds some light on 
this question, but none of them is capable of providing a definitive an-
swer. We thus echo Simon’s sentiment that “scholars should be en-
                                                                                                                    
 2. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, 
AND DEVELOPMENTS 228-29 tbl.3-6 (3d ed. 2003) (reporting disposition for 1994 through 
2001 Terms); Thomas C. Goldstein, Statistics for the Supreme Court’s October Term 2002, 
72 U.S.L.W. 3078, 3078 (July 15, 2003) [hereinafter Goldstein, 2002 Term Statistics]; Tho-
mas C. Goldstein, Statistics for the Supreme Court’s October Term 2003, 73 U.S.L.W. 3045, 
3046 (July 31, 2004) [hereinafter Goldstein, 2003 Term Statistics]. 
 3. The courts of appeals data in this paper are drawn primarily from the Annual Re-
ports of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
 4. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 119, 150 (2002) (using the term “affirmance effect”). 
 5. Simon, supra note 1, at 32. 
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couraged to pursue each and every avenue capable of enhancing our 
understanding”6 of why appellate judges do what they do. 
II.   THE AFFIRMANCE EFFECT 
 The American federal judicial system has thirteen intermediate appel-
late courts7 staffed by 179 active judges8 and one court of last resort with 
nine Justices.9 The courts of appeals handle the lion’s share of the sys-
tem’s appellate work; last year, for instance, they reviewed more than 
27,000 trial court decisions in the twelve general jurisdictions (circuits 
numbered one through eleven plus D.C.) and one specialized jurisdiction 
(the Federal Circuit).10 By contrast, the Supreme Court granted review to 
fewer than eighty out of the thousands of requests presented in the Octo-
ber 2003 Term.11 But, if your writ is granted by the Court, then you are 
almost assured of a victory: the Justices affirmed only twenty-two of the 
eighty cases they heard, or a mere 28%.12 By contrast, the circuit courts 
affirmed nearly 91% of the 27,000-plus rulings reviewed during the same 
time.13 Figures 1a and 2 show the affirmance rates and caseloads for the 
courts of appeals and Supreme Court respectively.  
FIGURE 1A 
CIRCUIT COURT CASELOAD AND AFFIRMANCE RATES:  1946-2003 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
 6. Id. 
 7. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000).  
 8. See id. § 44.  
 9. See id. § 1.  
 10. See 2003 DIR. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 34 tbl.S-1 [hereinafter ANNUAL 
REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/tables/s1.pdf (last visited Oct. 
14, 2004). 
 11. Goldstein, 2003 Term Statistics, supra note 2, at 3046. 
 12. Id. 
 13. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 27 tbl.B-5, 34 tbl.S-1 (presenting data for the 
October 2002 Term), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/contents.html (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2004). 
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FIGURE 2 
SUPREME COURT CASELOAD AND  
AFFIRMANCE RATES: 1946-2003 TERMS 
 
 
 The Supreme Court’s affirmance rate remained fairly steady dur-
ing the last half-century, dipping below 50% only four times since the 
1946 Term, as reflected in Figure 2. The circuit rate, by contrast, has 
seen a steady rise over the last half-century, from 72% in 1945 to 
82% in 1975 to nearly 91% in 2003. Figure 3 combines both rates on 
a single graph to highlight the difference. 
FIGURE 3 
AFFIRMANCE RATES: SUPREME COURT AND CIRCUIT COURTS 
 
 
 The courts of appeals’ treatment of lower court decisions reveals 
interesting characteristics when subjected to closer scrutiny. First, 
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the circuit affirmance rate appears to rise with caseload, as can be 
seen in Figure 1b (in which the vertical axes from Figure 1a have 
been adjusted to the minimum and maximum values of each vari-
able). Indeed, the rate of affirmances is strongly and positively asso-
ciated with the number of cases: the Pearson correlation, a statistical 
measure of association, is .95 (on an absolute scale of 0 to 1).14 Thus, 
a 9500-case increase in caseload corresponds to about a 6% increase 
in affirmance rate.15 If this relationship sounds unimpressive, keep in 
mind that the circuit docket has increased tremendously (more than 
tenfold from 1946 to present) while the affirmance rate moves more 
slowly (the proportion of affirmed cases has not even doubled). These 
two phenomena may be related in any number of ways: one may be a 
cause of the other or both may be the product of other forces. These 
simple statistics only give us an initial sense of some possible rela-
tionship. 
FIGURE 1B 
ADJUSTED GRAPHS: 1946-2003 
 
 
 The circuit affirmance rate also appears related to whether the 
ruling is published.16 Historically, practically all circuit opinions were 
printed in the Federal Reporter.17 But, beginning in the 1960s and 
                                                                                                                    
 14. This is the Pearson correlation, chosen because it is a standardized measure and 
thus is not dependent on the units of measurement. Caseload is measured in individual 
cases while affirmance rate is measured in percentage points. 
 15. That is, a one standard deviation increase in caseload is associated with a .95 
standard deviation increase in reversal rate. 
 16. Cf. Keith H. Beyler, Selective Publication Rules: An Empirical Study, 21 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 1, 31 (1989) (reporting the same finding for Illinois state appellate courts). 
 17. In 1964, the United States Judicial Conference recommended that courts of ap-
peals publish “only those opinions which are of general precedential value.” 1964 DIR. 
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 11, reprinted in 1962-1964 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
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picking up speed after 1973, circuit courts began to issue some opin-
ions without publishing them.18 The number of unpublished opinions 
has increased every year since.19 We set forth below the affirmance 
rate in published opinions for three time periods from 1946 to 1988, 
as calculated by Songer, Sheehan, and Haire using the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals Data Base sample.20 We are unaware of any available data 
on affirmance rate in unpublished opinions; however, we can infer 
that it is much higher by comparing the rate in published opinions to 
the rate in all merits decisions. When publication remained common 
practice (1946-1960), the two rates are essentially the same.21 But 
the rates diverge as fewer opinions are published. 
TABLE 1 
RATE OF AFFIRMANCE IN PUBLISHED OPINIONS COMPARED TO ALL 
MERITS DECISIONS 
TIME PERIOD PUBLISHED OPINION
22 
AFFIRMANCE RATE 
ALL MERITS DECISIONS 
AFFIRMANCE RATE 
1946-60 73.5% 74.6% 
1961-69 74.3% 77.5% 
1970-88 69.2% 83.0% 
 
 Finally, the courts of appeals have consistently been less receptive 
to criminal appellants than to civil ones. This is perhaps not surpris-
ing: the relative cost of appeal is lower for convicted defendants than 
for losing civil parties. Every year since 1946, the affirmance rate for 
criminal appeals has been higher than for civil appeals, ranging from 
                                                                                                                    
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. Prior to that time, the Federal Re-
porter contained every opinion. 
 18. In 1973, the United States Judicial Conference directed the circuits to develop lo-
cal rules for selective publication. COMM. ON USE OF APPELLATE ENERGIES, ADVISORY 
COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 3 
(1973). 
 19. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publi-
cation in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 
587 tbl.2 (1981) (finding a 38.3% publication rate for decisions in 1979); see also Martha J. 
Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining 
Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. 
U. L. REV. 757, 761-62 (1995). 
 20. See DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS OF APPEALS 105 tbl.5.1 (2000).  
 21. The difference may be the product of a small number of unpublished opinions or, 
more likely, of error—the standard error in the Songer sample or the clerk reporting error 
in the population number, or both. 
 22.  The published opinion number is based on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Data Base 
sample. See SONGER ET AL., supra note 20, at 105 tbl.5.1 (reporting reversal rate in a sam-
ple of published opinions). 
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roughly 87% to 99%.23 The proportion of criminal cases on the cir-
cuits’ docket has varied over time, experiencing an extended spike 
following key defendant’s rights rulings by the Warren Court. But 
the affirmance rate is only weakly positively correlated with the rela-
tive number of criminal cases on the docket. As with caseload and 
publication, the fact that a case is criminal gives us some information 
about whether it is likely to be affirmed. That said, the fact remains 
that the circuit affirmance rate is high even for civil cases, published 
cases, and in years with shrinking caseloads. 
III.   THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE AFFIRMANCE EFFECT 
 The high affirmance rate on the U.S. Courts of Appeals is puz-
zling. The dominant model of litigation behavior—the “selection 
model”24—only adds to the puzzle. Analyzing litigants rather than 
judges,25 George Priest and Benjamin Klein posit that litigants (in 
the civil justice system anyway) are rational actors seeking to maxi-
mize their outcomes.26 When deciding whether to go forward with ad-
judication or to settle a dispute, litigants compare the expected value 
of adjudication to the actual value of settlement. Most cases will set-
tle (even on appeal) because litigants can generally save money by 
doing so. The cases that fail to settle are those in which the litigants 
develop “divergent expectations” about the likely outcome in court, 
and this is most likely to occur in close cases where the court could 
come out either way. Because there is no reason to expect close cases 
to favor one side or the other, selection theory suggests that the af-
firmance rate in the courts of appeals should be about 50%. Kevin 
Clermont and Ted Eisenberg explain the logic of this account as fol-
lows: 
The usual brand of case-selection theory says that appeals should 
act like trials. Appeals that clearly favor either the appellant or 
the appellee would tend to be settled readily, because both sides 
could save costs by so acting in light of their knowledge of all as-
pects of the case. Difficult appeals falling close to the applicable 
decisional criterion would tend not to settle, because the parties 
                                                                                                                    
 23.  For affirmance rates from 1946 to 1984, refer to Table B-1 of each Annual Report 
of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts released in that pe-
riod. See source cited supra note 17. For affirmance rates from 1985 to 2003, refer to Table 
B-5 of each Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts released in that period. See source cited supra note 17. The annual reports from 
1997  to  2003  are  also   available  on  the  World  Wide  Web  at  http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
judbususc.judbus.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).  
 24. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
 25. Frank Cross refers to selection theory and others of its type as “litigant-driven” 
theories of decisionmaking. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of 
Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1490-91 (2003). 
 26. Priest & Klein, supra note 24, at 4.  
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would be more likely to disagree substantially with respect to their 
predicted outcomes. These unsettled, difficult appeals entailing di-
vergent expectations would fall more or less equally on either side 
of the decisional criterion, regardless of both the position of that 
criterion and the underlying distribution of cases. Case selection, 
then, should leave for appellate adjudication a residue of appeals 
exhibiting some nonextreme affirmance rate. Indeed, under simpli-
fying assumptions, and as a limiting implication, case-selection 
theorizing would even predict a 50% affirmance rate.27 
The affirmance rate in the courts of appeals, even for civil cases 
alone, is significantly higher than 50%,28 so selection theory sheds lit-
tle light on it. Perhaps political science and psychology will be more 
illuminating. 
A.   Political Science Rational-Actor Accounts 
 Political scientists who study law and courts do not adhere to a 
single theory of judicial decisionmaking, but most adopt a (quasi) ra-
tional-actor paradigm that is the building block of modern political 
science. Positive political theorist William Riker explains that the 
two essential characteristics of the rational-choice model are: “1. Ac-
tors are able to order their alternative goals, values, tastes and 
strategies. This means that the relation of preference and indiffer-
ence among the alternatives is transitive. . . . 2. Actors choose from 
available alternatives so as to maximize their satisfaction.”29 Some 
scholars believe the judge can best be understood as a sincere ra-
tional actor (the “attitudinal” model), but others contend the judge is 
better described as a sophisticated rational actor (“strategic” theory). 
We offer in the next two subsections a preliminary assessment of 
how each model might explain the relatively high affirmance rate on 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
 1.   Political Behavioralism and the Attitudinal Model 
 The dominant political science model of judicial behavior is the at-
titudinal model, which builds on the early work of Hermann Pritch-
                                                                                                                    
 27. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 150-51 (footnote omitted). 
 28. See id. at 150 (reporting an affirmance rate in federal civil cases of about 80%); see 
also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate 
Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias]; 
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil 
Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947. 
 29. William H. Riker, Political Science and Rational Choice, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 163, 172 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990). 
Riker is considered by many to be the father of positive political theory. See generally 
WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE 
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982). 
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ett30 and Glendon Schubert.31 Pritchett and Schubert transformed the 
study of judicial politics by focusing on individual voting behavior. 
The attitudinal model has evolved from a psychology-based perspec-
tive32 to a rational-choice one.33 The modern attitudinal model posits 
that judges are goal-oriented actors who, when making decisions, 
seek to maximize their sincere policy preferences or attitudes. The 
model generally assumes that the content of judicial opinions is not 
an accurate measure of judicial attitudes because judges have incen-
tives to veil their true goals or because they are unaware of the un-
derlying causes of their actions, or both.34 Attitudinal studies have 
adopted various measures of attitudes, drawing on judicial back-
ground and experience, political party of the appointing President, 
newspaper evaluations, and prior decisions.35 
                                                                                                                    
 30. See generally C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN 
JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947 (1948). Pritchett used simple statistics to 
evaluate systematically microlevel voting behavior on the Court between 1937 and 1947. 
For example, he identified distinct liberal and conservative voting blocs through agreement 
scores (which reflect the percentage rate at which a given Justice votes with another Jus-
tice) and revealed ideological preferences by counting votes on particular issues. Pritchett 
did not present an explanatory model of Supreme Court decisionmaking, but he did pro-
vide the basis for the development of the behavioral study of the Supreme Court. 
 31. See generally GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND 
IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946-1963 (1965) (drawing on the work of social 
psychologists, Schubert was the first to propose a model of judicial decisionmaking based 
on Justices’ attitudes). Stuart Nagel and John Sprague also wrote groundbreaking work on 
the subject shortly after the publication of The Judicial Mind. See generally STUART S. 
NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE (1969); JOHN D. SPRAGUE, 
VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1968). 
 32. See generally DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION 
MAKING (1976) (expanding on Schubert’s model with a construct of attitudes built on the 
work of psychologist Milton Rokeach).  
 33. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (presenting the best statement and defense of attitudinal 
theory); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
 34. Attitudinal scholars have considered the role of legal doctrine as a limiting or 
guiding force in decisionmaking. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature 
of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992); Jeffrey A. Segal, 
Predicting Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962-
1981, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 891 (1984). 
 35. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Ap-
peals, 1961-1964, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 374 (1966); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on 
the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491 (1975) (using a 
variety of social background variables including age, gender, race, prior employment, relig-
ion, and political party to explain circuit judges’ votes); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. 
Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Su-
preme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002) (estimating ideal points for the Jus-
tices on the U.S. Supreme Court using voting data); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, 
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 
(1989) (measuring judicial ideology based on the content of editorials written about a Su-
preme Court candidate after presidential nomination and before Senate confirmation); Jef-
frey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revis-
ited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995) (expanding the Segal and Cover scores to include Bush, Roose-
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 Appellate judges who seek single-mindedly to make decisions 
consistent with their policy preferences would vote to affirm every 
lower court ruling with which they agree. This forecast seems in-
consistent with the observed difference in the affirmance rates be-
tween the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals unless circuit 
judges and district judges are much more likely to concur than Su-
preme Court Justices and circuit judges. If that is true, then Su-
preme Court Justices must disagree nearly as frequently with dis-
trict judges as they do with circuit judges since the two sets of lower 
court judges are in apparent accord. However, there is some evi-
dence that the Supreme Court is more likely to reverse a circuit 
court that has reversed a district court.36  
 This simplistic attitudinal account seems insufficient. We can 
build a better attitudinal explanation, however, by considering each 
institution’s discretion over its caseload. An attitudinal account 
would explain the Supreme Court’s low affirmance rate by focusing 
on the Court’s agenda-setting power: the Justices enjoy discretion-
ary jurisdiction and thus choose almost all of the cases they hear 
(except for the small number of original disputes). The Court is 
more likely to grant certiorari to review lower court decisions that 
are ideologically inconsistent with the Court’s current majority be-
cause the Supreme Court acts ideologically, and thus it is more 
likely to grant certiorari to reverse than to affirm the lower court.37 
That is, the attitudinal model predicts that ideologically conscious 
Justices grant review and then reverse divergent opinions from the 
lower courts.  
                                                                                                                    
velt, and Truman appointees); C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Be-
havior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Deci-
sions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355 (1981) (finding that judicial background and 
appointing President’s ideology explained Justices’ decisions in civil liberties, civil rights, 
and economic liberties cases). 
 36. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda 
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988). 
 37. See, e.g., Virginia C. Armstrong & Charles A. Johnson, Certiorari Decisions by the 
Warren & Burger Courts: Is Cue Theory Time Bound?, 15 POLITY 141, 149 (1982) (finding 
that the Burger Court was more likely to grant certiorari to liberal appeals from court rul-
ings in civil liberties and economic liberties cases, and the Warren Court was more likely 
to grant certiorari in conservative economic liberties cases, but not in conservative civil lib-
erties disputes); Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Stra-
tegic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. 
POL. 824, 833 (1995) (examining certiorari and merits votes of Vinson Court Justices from 
1946 through 1952 and finding that Justices who voted to reverse a lower court decision 
were significantly more likely to have voted for certiorari than Justices who voted to af-
firm); Saul Brenner & John F. Krol, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States 
Supreme Court, 51 J. POL. 828, 832-33 (1989) (concluding, based on a sample of cases from 
selected terms of the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts, that Justices who voted in favor 
of certiorari were more likely to vote to reverse than Justices who opposed certiorari, and 
terming such voting behavior an “error correcting strategy”). 
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 The Court’s recent reduction in its caseload may reflect, in part, 
the grant-to-reverse effect: the conservative Rehnquist Court major-
ity has found it less necessary to review (and reverse) relatively more 
conservative decisions by the courts of appeals.38 Republican Presi-
dents have appointed a majority of sitting Justices: seven of the nine 
Justices in the current Natural Court, that is, a period without any 
turnover (1994 to present). And, during most of this period, Republi-
can appointees outnumbered Democratic appointees on the circuits.39 
Thus, the Court continues to reverse more cases than it affirms, but 
it hears fewer cases because it is so closely ideologically aligned with 
the circuit courts.40 
 The courts of appeals’ lack of agenda control, coupled with the 
ideological alignment of upper and lower court judges, may also ex-
plain the circuits’ high affirmance rate. In the federal system, the 
courts of appeals have mandatory jurisdiction over appeals from dis-
trict courts; thus, they must decide all cases properly brought to 
them. An attitudinal explanation for the high affirmance rate would 
be shared policy preferences between circuit and district judges. A 
quick way to analyze this would be to consider the proportion of cir-
cuit and district court judges who are Republican appointees. As re-
flected in the table below, the ratio of Republican to Democratic ap-
pointees on the courts of appeals is similar to that on the district 
courts. And, indeed, we would expect this to be true over time, as the 
sitting President appoints judges to the courts at similar rates. 
                                                                                                                    
 38. Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 557-61 (1998) (review-
ing LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)). 
 39. See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 
78 JUDICATURE 276, 291 tbl.6 (1995) (reporting composition by appointing President on 
January 1, 1995); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton’s First Term Judiciary: 
Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 272 tbl.8 (1997) (reporting composition by ap-
pointing President on January 1, 1997); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton’s Sec-
ond Term Judiciary: Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 264, 283 tbl.8 (1999) (re-
porting composition by appointing President on January 1, 1999); Sheldon Goldman et al., 
Clinton’s Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84 JUDCATURE 228, 253 tbl.8 (2001) (reporting 
the composition by appointing President on January 1, 2001, which is the only year cov-
ered in these biannual reports when Democratic appointees held an edge—though only a 
slight one—over Republican appointees); Sheldon Goldman et al., W. Bush Remaking the 
Judiciary: Like Father like Son?, 86 JUDICATURE 282, 298 tbl.1 (2003) (reporting composi-
tion by appointing President on January 1, 2003). For data reflecting earlier periods, see 
SONGER ET AL., supra note 20, at 31 tbl.2.1. For data on court composition by party of ap-
pointing President, see INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, THE 
NOMINATION PROCESS: THE COURTS, at http://www.independentjudiciary.org/courts/ (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2004) (listing current composition by circuit). 
 40. The Rehnquist Court’s affirmance rate has been higher, on average, than the two 
prior Courts. Only in the last three Terms has the Court’s affirmance rate dropped to the 
Warren era lows. This may also reflect the level of accord between the higher and lower 
appellate courts. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Rehnquist Court Disposition of 
Lower Court Decisions: Affirmation Not Reversal, 74 JUDICATURE 84, 86 (1990) (observing 
that initially the Rehnquist Court affirmed a higher proportion of cases than the Warren 
and Burger Courts and examining possible explanations). 
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TABLE 2 
COMPARISON OF CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT COMPOSITION, 200341 
  DEMOCRATIC APPOINTEES 
REPUBLICAN 
APPOINTEES 
PERCENTAGE 
REPUBLICAN 
CIRCUIT 65 84 56.4% 
ALL CIRCUITS 
DISTRICT 310 341 52.4% 
 
 We can consider the relationship between affirmance rate and court 
composition by looking at circuits separately. Some circuits are much 
more likely to reverse than others: The Second Circuit disagreed with dis-
trict courts in about 1% of its cases last term, whereas the D.C. Circuit 
differed with districts courts in nearly 15% of cases. Likewise, the compo-
sition of circuits varies: Republican Presidents appointed 80% of active 
Eighth Circuit judges, but only 35% of Ninth Circuit judges. If our attitu-
dinal hypothesis is correct, we would expect a statistical relationship be-
tween relative court composition (district as compared to circuit) and the 
reversal rate for the twelve general jurisdiction circuits. 
 Figure 4 presents circuit reversal rates and the relative ideology of 
the courts (as measured by party of appointing President). A quick 
look at the graphs would seem to reveal a relationship between a cir-
cuit’s likelihood of disagreeing with district judges and the difference 
between the circuit and district courts’ composition. 
FIGURE 4 
RELATIVE COURT COMPOSITION VERSUS REVERSAL RATE, 2003 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
 41. Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, at http://www.fjc.gov/ 
history/home.nsf (last visited Mar. 8, 2005) (providing biographical information about fed-
eral judges who have served from 1789 through the present). 
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 While ideological distance (as measured by composition) and re-
versal rate are positively correlated (as we expected), the correlation 
between the two variables is low: only 0.18 (perfect positive correla-
tion, of course, would be 1).42 This result may be driven by the outlier 
case of the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit has the largest differ-
ence between the percentage of Republican circuit and district ap-
pointees (34%), but one of the lowest reversal rates (8%). If we re-
move the Eighth Circuit, the correlation coefficient for the remaining 
circuits increases to 0.47. Thus, a one unit increase in the difference 
in court composition is associated with a .47 increase in the reversal 
rate. 
 The attitudinal model, then, might explain the relative difference 
in the Supreme Court’s and courts of appeals’ affirmance rates by fo-
cusing on their agenda-setting power. An appellate court with discre-
tionary jurisdiction generally does not review cases with which it 
agrees because the judges are satisfied with the lower court decision. 
Thus, the court can focus on decisions with which it disagrees. An 
appellate court with mandatory jurisdiction does not have that op-
tion and must review all cases.  
 State courts may offer richer data to test this hypothesis. Forty-
one states have two levels of appellate courts.43 There are many pat-
terns of discretionary and mandatory appellate jurisdiction in those 
states.44 An empirical study of affirmance rates in those state courts 
could control for the relative importance of agenda-setting power (as 
well as other factors such as judicial selection method). We are un-
aware of any published scholarship that does so. 
 2.   New Institutionalism and the Strategic Model 
 Increasingly, judicial scholars focus on institutional influences on 
judicial decisions as part of a general movement in political science 
termed “new institutionalism.”45 Strategic theories of judicial behav-
ior adopt the attitudinal position that judges or justices seek to 
achieve policy goals, but in order to attain their policy preferences, 
they consider the preferences and likely actions of other relevant ac-
                                                                                                                    
 42. We calculated the linear association between the two variables using a simple cor-
relation coefficient. We did not use the standardized coefficient (Pearson) because the two 
variables share the same units of measurement. 
 43. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2003, at 
7-59 (2004) (charting every state’s judicial system), http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/ 
csp/2003_Files/2003_SCCS.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
 44. See id.; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A Taxonomy of Appellate Court Organiza-
tion, in CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS: EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE STATE COURTS (1997). 
 45. See generally James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Or-
ganizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734 (1984) (heralding a “re-
turn” in political science to a consideration of the role of institutional structures and fea-
tures in political behavior generally). 
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tors.46 Leading proponents of this model, Forrest Maltzman, James 
Spriggs, and Paul Wahlbeck, explain that “strategic” refers to the 
fact that “justices’ choices [are] shaped, at least in part, by the pref-
erences and likely actions of other relevant actors.”47 Hence, strategic 
theorists emphasize the influence of institutional factors, such as in-
teractions with colleagues on the Court (internal dynamics) or reac-
tions of other institutional actors, most notably Congress and the 
President (exogenous constraints). 
 In order to understand why a judge votes to affirm (or reverse), a 
strategic theorist would contend that we need to know more than the 
ideological composition of the circuit and district courts. We also need 
to understand the relevant institutional forces in order to model the 
phenomenon. A strategic story would model a panel’s decision to af-
firm as the product of individual judges’ votes, which in turn are in-
fluenced by the other members of the panel and the circuit, the prior 
and anticipated actions of lower court judges, and the possible reac-
tion of the Supreme Court.  
 A circuit judge would consider the power of those above her in the 
judicial hierarchy. For example, a panel’s ruling is more likely to be 
reheard en banc and to be reviewed by the Supreme Court if the 
panel reverses the lower court (though the absolute probability re-
mains low). Thus, an individual judge would consider that risk 
(though chances are numerically small, the cost is high) when decid-
ing whether to vote in favor of reversal. This works against reversal.  
 A circuit judge also would consider her power to control those be-
low her in the judicial hierarchy. The appeals courts’ only means of 
disciplining district courts is reversal. Thus, it would seem necessary 
to reverse with some frequency to deter shirking by district judges. 
This works in favor of reversal. However, the district judges may be 
constrained because (1) they aspire to promotion and thus are re-
verse-averse, (2) they share common views with the courts of appeals 
(the attitudinal explanation), or (3) the costs of reversal in terms of 
reputational loss and additional workload mean the predicted loss is 
surprisingly high. Thus, a district judge’s incentives, which are 
known to circuit judges, may mitigate against the need for frequent 
reversal. 
                                                                                                                    
 46. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9-18 (1998) 
(presenting the leading strategic account of the Supreme Court); WALTER F. MURPHY, 
ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 31-36 (1964) (offering one of the first judicial theories 
built on the collective nature of appellate courts). 
 47. See Forrest Maltzman et al., Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist 
Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: 
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 43, 47 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 
1999). See generally FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: 
THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000). 
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 A strategic explanation of the Supreme Court’s very low affirmance 
rate does not directly conflict with the attitudinal explanation, but it 
does reveal a more complex process and also addresses one conundrum 
of the attitudinal explanation. Since the Supreme Court is formally at 
the apex of the judicial pyramid, the Court’s decisions can be concep-
tualized as a principal directing (or attempting to direct) its agents: 
the lower courts.48 In this model, Supreme Court Justices, seeking to 
advance their own policy preferences, will utilize certiorari review to 
monitor the activities of the agents, namely courts of appeals judges 
applying Supreme Court doctrine. If the Supreme Court uses certio-
rari primarily as a means of controlling recalcitrant circuits, it should 
reverse most of the decisions that it reviews, and in fact, it does.49  
 The foregoing explanation predicts the same outcome as the attitu-
dinal model. Thus, it would be impossible to test empirically the rela-
tive explanatory value of each. However, the strategic account does 
overcome one shortcoming in the sincere-rational-actor story. The atti-
tudinal explanation ignores the fact that only four votes are required 
to grant certiorari under the informal “Rule of Four.”50 Thus, it would 
seem possible that a four-Justice minority would disagree with a lower 
court ruling and vote for review, but these Justices would ultimately 
lose on the merits because they could not gain a fifth vote and the 
lower court would be affirmed. If this is true, the Supreme Court’s re-
versal rate would be lower when the Court is closely divided ideologi-
cally. The current Natural Court (1994-present) appears relatively 
closely divided: It has decided more than twenty percent of its cases by 
a one-vote margin.51 But, its reversal rate has been essentially the 
same as earlier courts. The reason is that a four-Justice minority will 
be reticent to favor certiorari although it could do so alone. Justices 
will behave strategically, refusing to vote for review of a decision if the 
majority of the Court is likely to affirm, and thereby strengthen the 
disfavored lower court position.52 
                                                                                                                    
 48. See Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent 
Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 675 (1994). See 
generally Matt Spitzer & Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649 (2000) 
(providing a framework for analyzing judicial monitoring of lower courts). 
 49. For a development and empirical test of this model, see Charles M. Cameron et 
al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme 
Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101 (2000). 
 50. Certiorari requires the vote of only four out of nine Justices, as opposed to the ma-
jority vote required to decide a case. For an account of this informal rule of Supreme Court 
practice, see DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 207-20 (6th ed. 2000). 
 51. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 224-25 tbl.3-4 (providing statistics for the 1994-
2001 Terms); Goldstein, 2002 Term Statistics, supra note 2, at 3079 (reporting five-to-four 
cases decided by the Supreme Court during the 2002 Term). 
 52. See Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Su-
preme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 570-71 (1999). 
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 The strategic theory also can improve on the attitudinal account 
of the high circuit affirmance rate by considering the relationships 
within a circuit court and between a circuit and other courts. The 
principal-agent construct reveals key features of the relationship be-
tween the panel and full court, situating the circuit court, as a whole, 
as the principal that authorizes the panel as the agent to act on its 
behalf. The circuit bench delegates the resolution of some cases to a 
given panel. The panel has limited discretion to resolve the disputes 
assigned to it.53 The explicit limitation on the panel is circuit prece-
dent in the form of published opinions, but implicit limitations, such 
as respect for informal circuit norms, also exist.54 When a circuit 
learns that a panel has violated any shared expectation about appro-
priate behavior, the circuit will act to censor the panel.55 But it is dif-
ficult and costly for the circuit to monitor the panel’s behavior be-
cause of information asymmetries; hence circuit judges will typically 
rely on “signals”—warning signs—to alert them when a panel has 
exceeded its authority.56 The circuit’s only formal mechanism of con-
trol is en banc review of the panel’s decisions.57 
 Circuit courts do not share the Supreme Court’s prerogative to se-
lect cases for review. Thus, most appeals courts’ decisions involve 
routine examinations of lower court outcomes, primarily using highly 
deferential standards of review, such as abuse of discretion or plain 
error.58 Hence it appears to be a shared expectation of the courts of 
                                                                                                                    
 53. Cf. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND 
MANAGEMENT 132 (1992); GARY J. MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF HIERARCHY 49-56 (1992) (explaining the principal’s delegation of authority to 
an agent by way of an incomplete contract which sets forth general, rather than detailed, 
boundaries on the agent’s authority). 
 54. See, e.g., J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 
191-92 (1981) (delineating the development and influence of informal norms and proce-
dures of decisionmaking within circuit courts); cf. PETER F. NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM 
ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 66 (1978) (explaining how 
collective efforts by courtroom elites (judges and lawyers) produce shared norms). 
 55. See Steven R. Van Winkle, Dissent as a Signal: Evidence from the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, at 3-4 (Aug. 29, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, delivered at the 1997 annual 
meeting of the American Political Science Association) (on file with author). 
 56. See, e.g., Songer et al., supra note 48, at 674 (describing how “[d]ifficulty in moni-
toring,” “asymmetric information,” and “transactions costs” provide agents with the oppor-
tunity to reach decisions contrary to the principal’s dictates); Van Winkle, supra note 55, at 
4. 
 57. Van Winkle, supra note 55, at 3 (noting that “[e]n banc review . . . is the only in-
tra-circuit way to enforce the terms of the incomplete contract, ex post, when a violation is 
suspected”). 
 58. See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, Standards of Review, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: 
THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 30, 31 
(Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (explaining that in many instances “the court of appeals [is] 
obliged by established standards to affirm unless, for example, crucial fact findings were 
not merely in error but clearly so” and, likewise, that “[d]iscretionary rulings [have] to be 
not merely incorrect, but abusive”). 
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appeals that decisions will affirm lower court rulings. Principal-agent 
theory would hold that such a strong norm acts as an implicit limita-
tion on the authority of panels. Hence, if a panel reverses a lower 
court, that panel’s decision would violate that limitation. It is rela-
tively easy for nonpanelists to detect violations of the affirmation 
norm and hence to decide whether to exact the sanction of en banc 
review on panels that defect from the norm. One recent empirical 
study found that the en banc court was much more likely to grant 
certiorari to panels reversing lower courts, holding other factors con-
stant.59 Thus the strategic theory predicts that low reversal rates be-
come self-reinforcing: Current judges are hesitant to reverse because 
prior judges did not reverse, and so on. 
 The circuit-district relationship can also be understood using the 
principal-agent construct. The courts of appeals enunciate doctrine 
that is effectuated by district courts. The circuits are not capable of 
writing decisions sufficiently explicit and broad to allow for only one 
outcome in a particular dispute. Thus, district judges may make de-
cisions that conflict with those that the courts of appeals would oth-
erwise have made. Circuit and district judges have their own prefer-
ences that reflect many factors, including policy goals, legal perspec-
tive, professional objectives, and personal desires. If those prefer-
ences are congruent, then a district judge will have no incentive to 
depart from the circuit’s preferences. If the preferences are divergent, 
a judge has an incentive to make a noncomplying ruling.  
 The appeals courts’ obvious mechanism of control over district 
courts is reversal of their decisions. Likewise, a district judge’s deci-
sion to make a ruling on her ideal point, rather than the circuit’s, will 
be affected by the availability of sanctions and the probability that 
she will be caught. That is, a district judge will consider the probabil-
ity of circuit reversal. Although the likelihood of reversal is relatively 
small given the courts of appeals’ recent practice, the cost of reversal 
may be perceived as higher than a rational-actor model would dic-
tate. For example, lower court judges who aspire to promotion to a 
higher court know that their success will depend in part on an 
evaluation of the number of times they have been reversed. The Fed-
eral Judicial Center estimates that between 40% and 60% of court of 
appeals appointments in the last century were district judges.60 Be-
cause there are almost four times as many district judges as circuit 
judges, the likelihood that any individual district judge would be pro-
moted is relatively low—estimated by one study to be 6% during the 
                                                                                                                    
 59. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En 
Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 267 (1999). 
 60. Daniel Klerman, Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
455, 460 (1999) (presenting data compiled by the Federal Judicial Center). 
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1990s.61 Yet, anecdotal evidence, as well as empirical studies of judi-
cial behavior, suggests that a far greater number of district judges 
aspire to promotion to the courts of appeals.62 
B.   Boundedly-Rational-Actor Account 
 The political science accounts of appellate judging assume that 
judges are rational actors who maximize their preferences when ren-
dering decisions.63 Whether seeking to comply with governing legal 
principles, to further their ideological goals, or to increase their 
chances of promotion, judges maximize. 
 These rational-actor accounts of judicial behavior assume that 
judges, like other individuals, fully process all available information, 
identify each available decision option, carefully calculate the costs 
and benefits of each, and then select the one that maximizes their 
preferences.64 Research conducted by psychologists, behavioral 
economists, and others over the past three decades calls the assump-
tions of rational-choice theory into question by demonstrating that 
individuals often depart from its dictates in systematic and predict-
able ways. To use Herbert Simon’s terminology, individuals are not 
fully rational actors but instead are “boundedly rational” actors65 who 
often rely on “heuristics,” or mental shortcuts, to make decisions that 
are “good enough.”66 
 There are two prominent approaches to bounded rationality:67 the 
well-known “heuristics and biases” approach68 (associated largely 
                                                                                                                    
 61. Id. at 461. 
 62. Id. at 463 (observing that “[l]awyers are often heard to say that a particular ruling 
reflects the fact that the judge is ‘gunning for the circuit’” and that “[w]hile the average 
probability of promotion is relatively low, particular judges may perceive it as higher”); see 
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 111-12 (1995) (indicating that the structure of the 
judicial compensation package discourages judges from seeking promotion outside the judi-
ciary); Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What’s “Unconstitutional” About 
the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 189 (1991) (indicating that judges 
seek promotions to a higher bench). 
 63. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 29.  
 64. For an accessible introduction to rational-choice theory in the legal literature, see 
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ra-
tionality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060-66 (2000). 
 65. See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198-99 (1957). See generally HERBERT A. 
SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 19-23 (1983). 
 66. See sources cited supra note 65. 
 67. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive 
Toolbox, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 3, 26-27 (Gerd Gigerenzer et al. 
eds., 1999) [hereinafter SIMPLE HEURISTICS] (observing the connection between the fast-
and-frugal program and the “adaptive decision maker” research developed by Payne, 
Bettman, and Johnson). 
 68. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics] (in-
troducing the heuristics-and-biases program). Many of the important early works are col-
lected in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et 
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with Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky) and the less familiar 
“fast and frugal heuristics” approach69 (associated with Gerd Giger-
enzer and his collaborators). Although these two approaches differ 
from one another,70 their similarities are greater than their dissimi-
larities. Most significantly, proponents of both the heuristics-and-
biases program and the fast-and-frugal-heuristics program contend 
that human beings are boundedly rational actors who use heuristics, 
or mental shortcuts, to make decisions.71   
 Judges, too, are human beings, and like other human beings, 
judges surely employ heuristics in their own decisionmaking.72 Indeed, 
recent studies of trial judges have found evidence that heuristics influ-
ence decisionmaking on the trial bench;73 it seems likely that appellate 
judges also use heuristics when making decisions on appeal.  
 Individuals are perhaps most likely to rely on heuristics when it is 
taxing to use more deliberative decision processes due to cognitive 
overload, limited time and attention, and so forth. Circuit court 
judges, who have substantial caseloads and limited discretion over 
                                                                                                                    
al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY]. Many of the important re-
cent works are collected in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter HEURISTICS AND BIASES]. 
 69. See, e.g., BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd Gigerenzer & 
Reinhard Selten eds., 1999) [hereinafter ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX]; SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra 
note 67. 
 70. First, as noted in the text, the heuristics-and-biases theorists embrace rational 
choice as a normative model, but the fast-and-frugal theorists do not. Second, and also 
noted in the text, the heuristics-and-biases researchers tend to dwell on the maladaptive 
properties of heuristics, while the fast-and-frugal theorists tend to focus on their adaptive 
properties. Third, the theorists in each camp define and test heuristics in different ways. 
The fast-and-frugal theorists develop what they call “computational models of heuristics” 
rather than relying solely on the “vague labels” used by the heuristics-and-biases theorists. 
Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 67, at 28. Gigerenzer and Todd define a “computational 
model of a heuristic” as one that “specifies the precise steps of information gathering and 
processing that are involved in generating a decision, such that the heuristic can be in-
stantiated as a computer program.” Id. at 16. Fourth, and relatedly, the heuristics-and-
biases researchers focus solely on judgment and decisionmaking, see sources cited supra 
note 68; the fast-and-frugal theorists focus not only on decision rules but also on rules for 
searching and stopping search. Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 67, at 16-17.  
 71. Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 67, at 28 (“Our research program of studying fast 
and frugal heuristics shares some basic features with the heuristics-and-biases program. 
Both emphasize the important role that simple psychological heuristics play in human 
thought, and both are concerned with finding the situations in which these heuristics are 
employed.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? 
(The Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud 
Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83 (2002) (arguing that judges use substantive law doctrinal rules 
of thumb to simplify decisionmaking in securities cases); Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Juris-
prudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2003) (arguing that appellate judges and other lawmak-
ers are boundedly rational); Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903 
(2002) (exploring the use of judge-made heuristics in securities fraud cases). 
 73. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) 
(finding evidence that judicial decisionmaking is influenced by anchoring, framing, hind-
sight bias, representativeness, and egocentric bias). 
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the cases they hear, are much more likely to find themselves in this 
position than Supreme Court Justices, who hear very few cases. 
Thus, we would expect the heuristics-based account we offer below to 
shed more light on circuit judge decisionmaking than on Supreme 
Court Justice decisionmaking. 
 1.   Heuristics-and-Biases Program 
 The heuristics-and-biases program embraces rational choice as a 
normative model of decisionmaking but rejects it as a positive model. 
Relying largely on experimental evidence documenting departures 
from rational choice, proponents of the heuristics-and-biases program 
argue that individuals often use heuristics, rather than the complex 
computations required by rational-choice theory, to make decisions. 
Because heuristics-and-biases theorists believe individuals should 
decide according to rational-choice theory but observe that they often 
do not, they worry that heuristics can be maladaptive. They ac-
knowledge that individuals often do well using heuristics, but they 
are concerned that heuristics can lead individuals astray. Tversky 
and Kahneman explain that individuals “rely on a limited number of 
heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing 
probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. 
In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead 
to severe and systematic errors.”74 
 The heuristics and biases theorists have identified a number of 
heuristics that individuals use to make decisions. Initially, Tversky 
and Kahneman focused their attention on three basic heuristics: 
availability, representativeness, and anchoring.75 More recently, 
Kahneman and his collaborator, Shane Frederick, have argued that 
the three basic heuristics are availability, representativeness, and 
the affect heuristic.76 Nonetheless, most decision researchers in this 
tradition use the term heuristics-and-biases loosely to include several 
                                                                                                                    
 74. Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics, supra note 68, at 1124. More recently, Kahne-
man and his collaborator, Shane Frederick, have explained heuristics as follows: 
We will say that judgment is mediated by a heuristic when an individual as-
sesses a specified target attribute of a judgment object by substituting another 
property of that object—the heuristic attribute—which comes more readily to 
mind. . . .  
 Because the target attribute and the heuristic attribute are different, the 
substitution of one for the other inevitably introduces systematic biases. 
Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution 
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 68, at 49, 53. 
 75. See Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics, supra note 68. 
 76. See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 74, at 56 (“It has become evident that an 
affect heuristic should replace anchoring in the list of major general-purpose heuristics.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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mental shortcuts that individuals have been shown to use.77 This is 
also true in the legal literature, where scholars writing in the still-
emerging field of “behavioral law and economics”78 use the term heu-
ristics and biases to encapsulate a number of phenomena.79 
 Two heuristics seem particularly likely to illuminate the affir-
mance effect in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: the status quo bias and 
the omission bias. 
(a)   Status Quo Bias  
 The first is the so-called “status quo bias.” All other things being 
equal, individuals tend to prefer an option that is consistent with the 
status quo rather than one that requires a change from the status 
quo.80 The literature includes ample illustrations of status quo bias. 
Researchers have found, for instance, that consumers given a choice 
between a highly reliable but more expensive utility (like electric 
service) and a less reliable but less expensive utility tend to choose 
whichever is the status quo option.81 Likewise, when choosing among 
auto insurance plans,82 health insurance plans,83 investment portfo-
lios,84 or contract terms,85 most people select the option representing 
the status quo. Researchers have even used the status quo bias to 
explain the incumbency effect in American electoral politics. Accord-
ing to Tversky and George Quattrone, “Because it is natural to take 
the incumbent’s policy as the status quo—the reference point to 
which the challenger’s policy is compared—and because losses loom 
larger than gains, it follows that the incumbent enjoys a distinct ad-
vantage.”86 In short, “preferences are shaped, in part, by superficial 
                                                                                                                    
 77. See, e.g., HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 68 (containing articles identifying 
and describing the operation of several different phenomena under the rubric of “heuristics 
and biases”); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 68 (same). 
 78. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (proposing behavioral law and economics as a field). 
 79. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1170-73 (2003) (observing that legal scholars have focused primar-
ily on the following five heuristics and biases: representativeness, availability, hindsight 
bias, anchoring, and self-serving bias). 
 80. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Mak-
ing, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). 
 81. See Raymond S. Hartman et al., Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo, 106 
Q.J. ECON. 141, 158-60 (1991). 
 82. See Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in 
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 288, 294 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 79, at 12-19. 
 85. See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psycho-
logical Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1586 (1998); Rus-
sell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 
611 (1998). 
 86. George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological 
Analyses of Political Choice, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 719, 725-26 (1988). 
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features of the task,” including “which option is labeled ‘status 
quo.’”87 
 With respect to judges, scholars have used the status quo bias to 
explain stare decisis. As Robert Prentice and Jonathan Koehler put 
it, “American judges adhere to stare decisis because it is an inheri-
tance from English tradition and therefore represents the status 
quo.”88 Moreover, “Judges will often accept the current state, which is 
represented by precedent, because to do otherwise would require sig-
nificant cognitive effort.”89 And, as Oona Hathaway observed, “By re-
lying on past decisions, judges can save significant time and effort 
and thereby consider far more cases than would otherwise be possi-
ble. Judges can turn to past analyses and avoid rethinking every as-
pect of a decision.”90 
 Likewise, each case on appeal comes with a status quo position: 
one party has won a judgment below. All other things being equal, 
appellate judges may prefer not to disturb the status quo position be-
cause the costs of doing so may appear to outweigh the benefits for 
two reasons. First, changing the status quo by reversing the lower 
court decision requires the appellate judge to impose a “loss” on a 
previously victorious litigant; although this means that a losing 
party below will incur a corresponding “gain,” psychological evidence 
demonstrates that losses are much more aversive than corresponding 
gains are attractive.91 Judges are likely to know this intuitively and 
perhaps even to feel the loss themselves. There is evidence, for ex-
ample, that judges are susceptible to “loss framing” when supervising 
litigants in settlement conferences;92 there is no obvious reason why 
appellate judges would not be susceptible to the same phenomenon. 
Second, and more simply, altering the status quo by reversing the 
lower court decision requires the appellate judge to expend time, at-
tention, and effort on the case that she would not otherwise have to 
expend. In other words, the path of least resistance is to “turn to 
                                                                                                                    
 87. Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision 
Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 598 (2003) (footnote omitted). 
 88. Id. at 638. 
 89. Id. at 639. 
 90. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 626 (2001). 
 91. Cf. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979) (“The aggravation that one experiences in 
losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the 
same amount.”). Research suggests that losses loom at least twice as large as equivalent 
gains. See Chip Heath et al., Goals as Reference Points, 38 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 79, 87 
(1999) (“Studies of risky choice and riskless choice have presented converging evidence 
that losses are weighted approximately two times more than equivalent gains . . . .” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
 92. See Guthrie et al., supra note 73, at 794-97. 
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[the] past analys[is] and avoid rethinking every aspect of [the] deci-
sion.”93  
 The status quo bias may play an even more prominent role on 
courts of appeals due to the phenomenon of “accountability.” Phil 
Tetlock and Richard Boettger have demonstrated in experimental 
studies that individuals who know they will be held accountable for 
their decisions are more likely to adhere to the status quo than are 
those who do not expect to be held accountable.94 Because individual 
judges are accountable to the litigants whose fates they determine 
(as well as to their copanelists, the circuit as a whole, and even the 
Supreme Court), the status quo bias may have an even greater influ-
ence on them. 
(b)   Omission Bias  
 Closely related to the status quo bias is the so-called “omission 
bias.” Individuals tend to react more strongly to a result that is the 
product of an apparent “action” rather than an apparent “inaction.”95 
Moreover, an individual “is perceived to be more responsible for out-
comes of commissions than for outcomes of omissions”96 and also to 
experience more regret as a consequence of an action rather than an 
omission. Consider the following example tested by Kahneman and 
Tversky: 
Paul owns shares in Company A. During the past year he consid-
ered switching to stock in Company B, but he decided against it. 
He now finds that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he 
had switched to the stock of Company B. George owned shares in 
Company B. During the past year he switched to stock in Company 
A. He now finds that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he 
had kept his stock in Company B. Who feels more regret?97 
George and Paul obtained the same outcome, but most study partici-
pants indicated that George would experience more regret than 
                                                                                                                    
 93. Hathaway, supra note 90, at 626; see also Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power 
in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 391 (“Judges, like other people, 
become habituated to and invested in the tasks, activities, and procedures they customar-
ily and repetitively perform. They overestimate the disruption that would arise from 
switching to new tasks or activities.” (footnote omitted)). 
 94. Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability Amplifies the Status Quo Ef-
fect when Change Creates Victims, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (1994). 
 95. See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 400-01 (3d ed. 2000); see also 
Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Attributions of Responsibility and Affective Reactions to Decision 
Outcomes, 104 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 303, 304 (2000) (“Outcomes achieved through action 
generally lead to more intense affective reactions than the same outcomes achieved 
through inaction.” (citations omitted)). 
 96. Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambi-
guity, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263, 275 (1990). 
 97. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 SCI. AM. 
160, 173 (1982). 
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Paul.98 George, not Paul, acted, and actions that turn out poorly in-
duce more negative affect than inactions that turn out poorly.99  
 The omission bias thus induces people not to act, to just “leave 
things as they are.” In the courts of appeals, judges have essentially 
two choices: they can leave the lower court opinion undisturbed, 
which is akin to an omission, or they can disturb the lower court 
opinion by reversing (or reversing and remanding, reversing in part, 
and so on), which is akin to a commission. Given the omission bias 
(in conjunction with the status quo bias), it seems reasonable to pre-
dict that judges would favor affirmances over reversals. In so doing, 
they protect themselves psychologically because any negative out-
come resulting from the decision is a product of the trial judge’s ac-
tion, not the appellate judge’s inaction. Moreover, the law generally 
favors omissions over commissions. As Prentice and Koehler put it, 
“The law favors inaction over action and the usual over the unusual. 
Existing principles are presumed to be appropriate and are relatively 
unscrutinized. Old laws that would never receive support if offered 
anew go unchallenged. When suggestions for change do emerge, they 
are received skeptically.”100  
2.   Fast-and-Frugal-Heuristics Program 
 The fast-and-frugal-heuristics program departs in an even more 
dramatic way from rational-choice theory. In contrast to the heuris-
tics-and-biases program, which rejects rational-choice theory only on 
positive grounds, the fast-and-frugal program rejects rational-choice 
theory as both a positive and normative account of decisionmaking.  
 From a normative perspective, the proponents of the fast-and-
frugal-heuristics program argue that a decision strategy should be 
assessed on the basis of its success or failure in real-world environ-
ments, not according to whether it complies with the logical and 
mathematical rules of rational-choice theory.101 As Gigerenzer and 
his colleague Peter Todd explain: 
There are no optimal strategies in many real-world environments 
in the first place. This does not mean, though, that there are no 
performance criteria in the real world. As a measure of the success 
                                                                                                                    
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Prentice & Koehler, supra note 87, at 589-90 (footnotes omitted). 
 101. See Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 67, at 28 (“The [fast-and-frugal approach] dis-
penses with the focus on coherence criteria (e.g., the laws of probability) as the yardsticks 
of rationality. Instead, we study the correspondence-based performance of heuristics in 
real-world environments, situations where optimal coherent strategies are often not known 
or not feasible.”); Gary Klein, The Fiction of Optimization, in ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX, supra 
note 69, at 103, 104 (arguing that “optimization cannot and should not be a gold standard 
for decision making”). 
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of a heuristic, we compare its performance with the actual re-
quirements of its environment, which can include making accurate 
decisions, in a minimal amount of time, and using a minimal 
amount of information. We have thus replaced the multiple coher-
ence criteria stemming from the laws of logic and probability with 
multiple correspondence criteria relating to real-world decision 
performance.102 
 From a positive perspective, the fast-and-frugal-heuristics theo-
rists reject rational-choice theory on the grounds that it paints an 
unrealistic picture of how individuals actually make decisions, view-
ing “the mind as if it were a supernatural being possessing demonic 
powers of reason, boundless knowledge, and all of eternity with 
which to make decisions.”103 They propose, instead, a more “psycho-
logically plausible”104 approach to decisionmaking: 
The goal of the program is to understand how actual humans . . . 
make decisions, as opposed to heavenly beings equipped with prac-
tically unlimited time, knowledge, memory, and other infinite re-
sources. The challenge is to base models of bounded rationality on 
the cognitive, emotional, social, and behavioral repertoire that a 
species actually has.105 
 In short, the fast-and-frugal-heuristics theorists claim not only 
that individuals do use heuristics when making decisions but also 
that they should use heuristics because they will obtain good out-
comes in a fast and frugal manner. As Gigerenzer and Todd put it, 
“whereas the heuristics-and-biases program portrays heuristics as a 
frequent hindrance to sound reasoning, rendering Homo sapiens not 
so sapient, we see fast and frugal heuristics as enabling us to make 
reasonable decisions and behave adaptively in our environment—
Homo sapiens would be lost without them.”106 
 The fast-and-frugal-heuristics theorists have identified several 
heuristics that individuals use in real-world environments, including 
“ignorance-based” heuristics,107 “one-reason” heuristics,108 and heuris-
tics that reflect social and cultural forces.109  
                                                                                                                    
 102. Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 67, at 22. 
 103. Id. at 5. 
 104. Gerd Gigerenzer, The Adaptive Toolbox, in ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX, supra note 69, at 
37, 38. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 67, at 29. 
 107. See generally Daniel G. Goldstein & Gerd Gigerenzer, The Recognition Heuristic: 
How Ignorance Makes Us Smart, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 67, at 37; Bernhard 
Borges et al., Can Ignorance Beat the Stock Market?, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 67, 
at 59. 
 108. See generally Jean Czerlinski et al., How Good Are Simple Heuristics?, in SIMPLE 
HEURISTICS, supra note 67, at 97; Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Betting on One 
Good Reason: The Take The Best Heuristic, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 67, at 75; 
Laura Martignon & Ulrich Hoffrage, Why Does One-Reason Decision Making Work? A Case 
382  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:357 
 
(a)   Recognition Heuristic  
 The “recognition heuristic”110 is an example of an “ignorance-
based”111 heuristic. Applicable only when an individual is attempting 
to select one of two (or more) options and recognizes only one of those 
options,112 the recognition heuristic posits that “[i]f one of two objects 
is recognized and the other is not, [the individual should] infer that 
the recognized object has the higher value.”113 For example, research-
ers asked students from Germany and the United States to indicate 
which city—San Diego or San Antonio—has a larger population. 
Surprisingly, 100% of the German students but only 62% of the 
American students correctly chose San Diego. Why? “All of the Ger-
man students had heard of San Diego, but many of them did not rec-
ognize San Antonio. They were thus able to apply the recognition 
heuristic and make a correct inference. The American students, rec-
ognizing both cities, were not ignorant enough to be able to apply the 
recognition heuristic.”114 Ignorance-based heuristics, like the recogni-
tion heuristic, are unlikely to shed much light on the affirmance ef-
fect because judges, too, are unlikely to be “ignorant enough” about 
the matters in front of them to employ these ignorance-based heuris-
tics successfully. However, the recognition heuristic might help ex-
plain the so-called “repeat player” effect in court, according to which 
those entities who appear frequently in court—governments, corpo-
rations, insurance companies, and so forth—tend to fare better than 
those “one-shotters” who appear only once.115 That is, judges might 
                                                                                                                    
Study in Ecological Rationality, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 67, at 119; Laura Mar-
tignon & Kathryn Blackmond Laskey, Bayesian Benchmarks for Fast and Frugal Heuris-
tics, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 67, at 169; and Jörg Rieskamp & Ulrich Hoffrage, 
When Do People Use Simple Heuristics, and How Can We Tell?, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, su-
pra note 67, at 141. 
 109. See generally ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX, supra note 69. 
 110. See generally Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 67. 
 111. See Goldstein & Gigerenzer, supra note 107, at 57. 
 112. Id. at 41. 
 113. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 114. Id. at 43. Likewise, in another study, researchers asked German and American 
subjects to make hypothetical stock purchase decisions. See Borges et al., supra note 107, 
at 59. Those who followed the recognition heuristic—that is, those who invested in compa-
nies whose names they recognized—built portfolios that performed better than others over 
a six-month period (though this was during a bull market, when one might expect this 
strategy to perform disproportionally well). See id. at 71.  
The impressive performance of recognition-based portfolios was obtained in a 
strong bull market. We do not yet know how well these results would general-
ize to other periods, such as a decreasing bear market. One explanation for the 
recognition heuristic’s good performance is that it is picking “big” firms, which 
are known to do well in up markets. 
Id. 
 115. See generally Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead? Winning 
and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 403 (1987); Marc 
Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
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make note of the parties (or their counsel) and tend to rule favorably 
for those whom they have encountered previously. Because those 
they have encountered previously are likely to fall into the repeat-
player category, repeat players might fare better due to this recogni-
tion heuristic.  
(b)   One-Reason Heuristics  
 The so-called “one-reason” heuristics are only slightly more com-
plicated than the “ignorance-based” heuristics. According to the one-
reason heuristics, individuals choose between options based on one 
salient dimension.116 Two one-reason heuristics might contribute to 
the affirmance effect: the “take the first” heuristic and the “take the 
last” heuristic. Using the take-the-first heuristic117—a heuristic that 
is most appropriate for expert decisionmakers like judges118—
individuals simply adopt the first course of action that comes to 
mind.119 Thus, a judge may simply affirm a case in front of her be-
cause that is the decision strategy most likely to occur to her first. 
The take-the-last heuristic is similar, though it is potentially appro-
priate for both expert and nonexpert decisionmakers. Using the take-
the-last heuristic,120 individuals simply use the same decision cue 
they used before to make the decision. Thus, if an appellate judge 
voted to affirm in a similar prior case, she might simply opt to do the 
same thing this time around. Neither of these heuristics can account 
for why judges initially decided to affirm because both assume some 
recollection of prior decision strategies—take-the-last does so explic-
                                                                                                                    
 116. Gigerenzer, supra note 104, at 45 (observing that one-reason heuristics “rely only 
on one cue to make the decision and ignore all others”). 
 117. See generally Daniel G. Goldstein et al., Group Report: Why and When Do Simple 
Heuristics Work?, in ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX, supra note 69, at 173. 
 118. Id. at 177.  
Take The First is argued to be effective because, for an expert, part of recogniz-
ing or categorizing a situation as typical is to recall what to do in that situation. 
Options generated are not random but may come to mind in order of quality. 
Take The First is less successful in domains where the decision maker is not an 
expert or in completely novel situations within a domain of expertise. 
Id. 
 119. Id.  
[W]hen faced with a problem to solve, often the best course of action to take is 
the first (or only) one that comes to mind. The strategy of evaluating solutions 
as they come to mind, and stopping with the first one that satisfies an aspira-
tion level, is called Take The First. 
Id. 
 120. Gigerenzer & Goldstein, supra note 108, at 80.  
[Take-The-Last] uses a heuristic principle for search that draws on a strategy 
known as an Einstellung set. Karl Duncker and other Gestalt psychologists 
demonstrated that when people work on a series of problems, they tend to start 
with the strategy that worked on the last problem when faced with a new, simi-
lar-looking problem . . . . 
Id. 
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itly and take-the-first does so implicitly because the first thought 
that occurs to a decisionmaker will often be based on expertise aris-
ing from prior experience—but both the take-the-first heuristic and 
the take-the-last heuristic might help explain the perpetuation of the 
affirmance effect.  
(c)   Imitation 
 Finally, some heuristics are a product of social and cultural fac-
tors. As Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten explain, “Social norms can 
be seen as fast and frugal behavioral mechanisms that dispense with 
individual cost-benefit computations and decision making.”121 This 
means that “[a]daptive solutions can be found with little knowledge; 
the price for this is that they are not general, but do work in a spe-
cific environment, culture, or time.”122  
 One such heuristic is the “imitation heuristic,”123 which is “a fast 
and frugal strategy that saves an organism from having to extract in-
formation from the environment anew, or from calculating from 
scratch.”124 This heuristic “allow[s] individuals to save the costs of in-
dividual learning, experimentation, and search by exploiting the in-
formation available in the minds of other individuals.”125 Following 
such imitation strategies “as ‘eat what older and experienced con-
specifics eat’ or ‘prefer mates picked by others’ can speed up decision 
making by reducing the need for direct experience and information 
gathering.”126  
 Using the imitation heuristic, an appellate judge would simply 
make the same decision that relevant others have made. The judge 
might defer to what most others confronted with the same decision 
have decided127—for example, the district judge below, other circuits, 
or other colleagues on the panel—or she might defer to those whom 
she deems to have greater status than her128—for example, other 
judges in her circuit or in other circuits who have faced the same es-
sential decision. Whether imitating the district judge below or other 
                                                                                                                    
 121. Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten, Rethinking Rationality, in ADAPTIVE 
TOOLBOX, supra note 69, at 1, 10. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See generally Joseph Henrich et al., Group Report: What Is the Role of Culture in 
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circuit judges, an appellate judge who decides per the imitation heu-
ristic is likely to affirm the decision in front of her because that is 
consistent with what the trial judge decided below and what her col-
leagues on the appellate bench, particularly those who share her 
ideological preferences, are likely to do.129  
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 We have attempted in this Article to examine the affirmance ef-
fect on the U.S. Courts of Appeals through the lens of political sci-
ence, psychology, and behavioral economics. Are these disciplines 
necessary to this inquiry? The affirmance effect may simply be the 
product of two phenomena: the “deference norm” on the courts of ap-
peals and the tendency of experts to agree with one another about 
three-quarters of the time.130 These factors are undoubtedly relevant 
to understanding the affirmance effect, but we believe our analyses 
of individual decisionmaking and institutional behavior also shed 
light on why circuit court judges so frequently “just say no” to appel-
lants.  
                                                                                                                    
 129. The “bounded rationality” explanation we have developed in this Article takes as 
its unit of analysis the individual judge. We recognize, of course, that circuit judges decide 
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